Classical logic is the study of "safe" formal reasoning. Western Philosophers developed classical logic over a period of thirty-three centuries after its introduction in 
knowledge and is never withdrawn so long as the premises are maintained. This gives rise to a unique deductive closure of the set of premises, consisting of all deductive consequences of the premises. Thus it was that we have accumulated over thousands of years a larger and larger body of theorems in classical mathematics, all consequences of a few premises which are now called the axioms of set theory by a fixed set of rules of inference, all part of the deductive closure of the premises using the logical calculi taught in the conventional courses of logic. These logics are "monotone", that is, conclusions, once established, are never retracted. Larger sets of premises give larger sets of conclusions.
Non-monotone logics have been developed recently which describe commonsense reasoning which is neither a restriction nor an extension of classical logic. Consequences of premises are drawn as much due to the absence as to the presence of knowledge. When more knowledge is acquired, conclusions previously drawn may have to be withdrawn because the rules of inference that led to them no longer are active. Intelligent decision makers use this form of commonsense reasoning to infer actions to be performed from premises which cannot be made by classical logic inference, because they simply have to make decisions whether or not there is enough information for a classical logical deduction.
To see what this means, we have to explain in what sense classical logic and its restrictions and extensions encompass all "safe" modes of reasoning. A "safe" mode of reasoning is one in which every conclusion drawn from premises by this mode of reasoning is true in all intended interpretations (or models) in which the premises are true. A "completeness and correctness theorem" for a system says that the "safe" rules of deduction in the textbooks generate exactly all those conclusions from premises which are true in every interpretation in which all the premises are true.
Thus any extension or restriction of classical logic with a notion of interpretation or model and a completeness and correctness theorem for that notion does not need any new "safe" rules of inference, except perhaps to expedite deductions.
So the extra element in commonsense reasoning that allows different conclusions to be drawn than in classical logics is the use of rules of inference which are not "safe".
They are to be used not because they are safe or unsafe, but because they usually give conclusions useful for decision making that can not otherwise be obtained. For a rule to be "unsafe" means there exist interpretations, or states of the world, in which the premises of the rule hold, but the conclusions do not. The intention is that we use such rules when we expect exceptions to be rare. Such unsafe rules of inference are characteristically used when conclusions must be drawn and decisions made but our knowledge and past experience is too limited, too uncontrolled, or too unmodelled to draw a decision by classical logical or statistical inference. Formalized commonsense reasoning is provide a a principled method of "jumping to conclusions" based on premises that are merely "rules of thumb". formalized. McCarthy, building on the efforts of earlier philosophers stemming from those mentioned above, showed how to formalize at least some commonsense reasoning [23] . This discovery formed the impetus for pioneering investigations of of Reiter, [24, 25] , McDermott and Doyle, [26, 27] and others. All this led to the development of what is now a popular area of research, Nonmonotonic Logics -which we shall outline in this article.
We believe that the development and computer implementation of non-monotonic systems is a necessary prolegomena to the development of future intelligent systems capable of simulating higher human cognitive functions.
Classical Logic
Classical Logic, be it in its propositional fragment, predicate fragment or other logics (modal and intuitionistic ones) is based on the notion of consequence. In this general framework a logic is represented by its syntax i.e. the set of its well-formed formulas and semantics which provides the meaning to that syntax. Thus, usually, we have a certain set of formulas constructed inductively from some primitive (atomic) formulas by means of appropriate functors. Next we assign to such language a semantics These are valuations of propositional variables (in case of propositional logic), relational structures (in case of predicate logic) or Kripke structures (for intuitionistic and modal logics). Semantics always generates a semantic consequence relation defined by means of semantic entailment. Let us see how it works in the case of propositional logic. We say that a formula ϕ is a semantic consequence of a set of formulas T (is semantically entailed by, in symbols T |= ϕ) if every valuation satisfying every formula from T , satisfies ϕ as well. The propositional logic is decidable, that is there is an algorithm for testing if a formula ϕ is entailed by a finite set of formulas,
T . The technique of tableaux provides one such method. Moreover we can list all the valuations of variables appearing in T and ϕ and check them. In the case of predicate logic such technique is not available. The reason is that one has to take into account infinite relational structure. Moreover there is infinitely many of them.
This implies that the semantic entailment relation T |= ϕ is not effective. Therefore it is desirable to have a syntactic technique for testing entailment. Specifically we seek methods that use formula manipulation to test entailment. This is done by means of provability. This relationship is denoted by T ⊢ ϕ. There are various techniques for the syntactic entailment. These include: natural deduction, [28] , Hilbert-style systems, [8] , resolution refutation, [29] and semantic tableaux, [30, 31] . It always involves manipulation of formulas and derivation of additional formulas by syntactic means. The key result in such techniques is always a completeness property which says that T |= ϕ if and only if T ⊢ ϕ. There are several completeness theorems, for each of the logics mentioned above separately. Since the proofs are finite, completeness property implies compactness property, that is the statement that T |= ϕ if and only if for some finite subtheory T ′ ⊆ T , T ′ |= ϕ. This also implies that the set of consequences of a theory T is recursively enumerable in T .
Let us look now at the abstract form of the consequence operation described above. Let Cn(T ) be the set of semantic consequences of the theory T . Since a larger theory has less models, and T is the intersection of the sets of formulas true in all these models, we find the following property of theories, called monotonicity
Consequence operations have other properties as well, for instance it is easy to see that Cn is idempotent, that is Cn(Cn(T ) = Cn(T ), but monotonicity is a fundamental property. It tells us that once we established a fact on the basis of our theory, we will never have to withdraw it as long as we only add new premises. Any future additional observations can only confirm it. This property governs the way our knowledge accumulates. Whatever is proved using logic remains true. Thus, in spite of the fact that our knowledge grows, the formal results in Mathematics accumulate. Whatever was proved, stays proved forever as long as the assumptions grow.
Commonsense Reasoning
Although the logical consequences of formulas in which we believe should also be believed (after all, if we believe that all men are mortal and Socrates is a man, then we have to believe that Socrates is mortal), in commonsense we often employ, in addition to classical logic reasonings, some other methods of reaching conclusions.
There are numerous types of argumentation used in commonsense reasoning. For instance we often make a tacit assumptions that we have a complete information about some fact. Then, it is enough to list explicitly only those which are truethe remaining are inferred false by our tacit assumption. Clearly such reasoning is not monotonic. Indeed, let T consists of facts that are assumed to be true. Now, if we add another fact, not in T , then previously it was assumed to be false, but now it is true, so the monotonicity property is violated. Similarly, we often reason using "default reasoning", that is we make assertions simply because we do not have information which blocks making such inferences. But, again, such reasoning cannot be monotonic. If our beliefs are augmented by new facts blocking the inferences, then the inference which led to the specific conclusion may be blocked. Yet another method of reasoning (related to the the previous one) is reasoning from both belief and absence of thereof. If we use in our reasoning the fact that we do not have a fact among beliefs then our reasoning may become invalid if a new belief is asserted.
Yet another method of reasoning is when we reason about the effects of actions. We then tend to think that only those aspects of the world that are directly related to the action performed could have changed. But, of course, such reasoning must be nonmonotonic, as additional things could change by unrelated reasons.
The formal proposals which we will discuss in the subsequent sections of this review address the technical developments addressing the above modes of reasoning.
What is most amazing in the theory we present is that they can be formalized at all.
Thus we will present Closed World Assumption, Default Logic, Modal Nonmonotonic Logics, and Circumscription. We will also discuss some nonmonotonic aspects of Logic Programming and a general mechanism for treating nonmonotonicity in logic.
The subject of this article is discussed in several monographs. These include: [32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 31] . The theory of nonmonotonic reasoning is, at present, an active area of research in Artificial Intelligence and many monographs will, undoubtedly, follow.
Closed World Assumption
Closed World Assumption (CWA for short) is historically the earliest form of nonmonotonic reasoning. It is due to Reiter, [24] . Reiter analyzed the way in which information is extracted out of databases and realized that a database contains, implicitly, a great wealth of negative information. That is, every elementary fact that can be stored in a database but is not, is assumed to be false. This is the reason why, when asking an airline phone operator for a flight from New York City to San
Francisco arriving at 7:45 am you get either yes or no answer, but (in principle) no "I do not know" for an answer. The reason is that the lack of information is processed as falsity. More formally, given a database encoded as a first-order theory T , define, for an atomic ground statement p
When T is a propositional theory then CWA(T ) is a complete theory. The reason is that for each atom p, p ∈ CWA(T ) or ¬p ∈ CWA(T ).
In general, CWA is not a safe mode of reasoning. In fact for a consistent theory
T CWA(T ) may be inconsistent. For instance the theory T = {p ∨ q} is consistent whereas CWA(T ) is inconsistent. Generally, CWA handles disjunctive information poorly. The basic result on reasoning under CWA, due to Reiter, [24] , is that for a
Horn theories (that is theories consisting of clauses which have at most one positive literal) CWA is a safe mode of reasoning. That is, if T is consistent and Horn theory, then CW A(T ) is consistent too.
The operator described by CW A is nonmonotonic. That is T 1 ⊆ T 2 does not imply
. This follows immediately from our remark that CW A(T ) is complete in propositional case.
CW A is closely related to Logic Programming. Specifically, if P is a (Horn) logic program, P ground is the set of ground instances of clauses of P , then CW A(P ground )
is precisely the propositional theory of the least Herbrand model of P . This implies that the answers to the ground atomic queries to P coincide with the results of SLD resolution with respect to P . More information on CW A and Logic Programming can be found in, [37] .
Default Logic
Default logic is one of the better understood formalisms in Nonmonotonic Reasoning.
It admits various interpretations, but the most popular is that it assigns meaning to the quantifier "under usual circumstances". The idea here is to capture the meaning 
where α, β 1 , . . . , β k , γ are sentences of the underlying language L.
A rule of the form (1) is sometimes interpreted as: "if α has been established, and all β 1 , . . . , β k are all possible then derive γ". The main issue here is how we interpret the word "possible". Specifically, possible with respect to what? Since the first-order logic (be it propositional or predicate) offer a way of interpreting "possible β" as "possible with respect to a theory T " (namely as T ⊢ ¬β) the question arises which T should be selected. Reiter offered an elegant solution to this problem. In order to formally define the way the rules are applied and, subsequently, define the consequences of default theory we introduce a notion of T -consequences of a default theory D, W . Namely, if T ⊆ L, then the T -consequences of D, W is the smallest set S of formulas satisfying these conditions:
Clearly, such least set exists for any T . T controls which rules are applicable in the process of making the derivation. Following Reiter denote Γ(T ) the set so constructed.
Clearly, Γ depends on both D and W .
Now we can see why we were talking about reasoning "in usual circumstances".
Namely, the rule of the form (1) 
Thus the usual ways of computing a fixpoint fail and there is no guarantee that a fixpoint exist.
Notice that our analysis of the operator Γ implies that the equation Γ(T ) = T means two things:
(a) Every formula in Γ(T ) belong to T . That is all formulas which have a derivation from D, W using T as a controlling context belong to T . This means that nothing outside of T will be derived.
(b) Every formula in T possesses a derivation with T serving only as a controlling context for applicability of rules. That is all the formulas in T can be reconstructed from W using underlying logic and those rules of D which are not blocked by T .
As noticed above, there is no guarantee that a default theory possesses an exten-sion. Also, if extensions exist they may be multiple. Hence, in opposition to classical logic, default logic assigns to a default theory a single, multiple or no consequences at all.
Given a default rule of the form (1), define c(r) = γ and c(D) = {c(r) : r ∈ D}.
Then it can easily be proved that for every S, Γ(S) ⊆ Cn(W ∪ c(D)). This is a "bounding principle" which allows us to compute examples.
} where p, q are distinct propositional variables. Then according to the above bounding principle there are only two candidates for extensions of D, W , T 1 = Cn({p}) and T 2 = Cn({p, q}). Since
On the other hand ¬¬q ∈ T 2 , Γ(T 2 ) = Cn({p}) = T 2 . Thus T 2 is also not an extension of D, W and so D, W has no extension.
} where p, q and r are distinct propositional variables.
Again we have two candidates for an extension of D, W , T 1 = Cn({p}) and If S is a set of formulas then a default rule of the form (1) is called a generating default for S if α ∈ S, ¬β 1 / ∈ S, . . . , ¬β k / ∈ S. GD(D, S) is the set of all generating defaults for S belonging to D.
We will formulate a number of fundamental properties of default extensions. For instance default logic possesses several normal forms, [38] .
Besides normal defaults one often considers seminormal defaults. These rules are of the form complete.
In the case of normal default theories the first problem is simple, because every normal default theory possesses an extension. The second and the third problem have the same complexity.
Default logic is a formalism based, primarily on extension of syntactic constructions of first order logic. Nevertheless there are several semantical characterizations of extensions. Lifschitz, [40] and Guerreiro and Casanova, [41] 
Nonmonotonic Aspects of Logic Programming
A Horn logic program is a finite set of expressions of the form
HereX is a string of variables. Not all variables must appear in all predicates. An expression (4) is called a clause, p(X) is the head of that clause whereas q 1 ((X)), . . . , q m (X)
is the body of the clause. Such clause possesses a logical interpretation. It is a formula
ground(P ), where P is a program, is the family of all ground substitutions of clauses from P .
With a program P we associate an operator T P , mapping subsets of Herbrand base into subsets of Herbrand base, by a the following
van Emden and Kowalski, [46] . Operator T P is monotone and compact. Hence, by
Knaster-Tarski Lemma, T P possesses the least fixpoint. This fixpoint coincides with the least Herbrand model M P of P . Moreover, if P 1 , P 2 are two programs,
When we introduce negation into the body of clauses of the program, we get general logic programs. They consist of clauses of the form:
The notion of the logical interpretation and of the operator T P generalize directly to general logic program in a natural fashion.
Although a general logic program always possesses a model (Herbrand base is a model of every program), the existence of the least Herbrand model is no longer
guaranteed. There are, however, always minimal models of general logic program.
There may be several minimal models of a general programs. The question how to assign the meaning of a general program is one of the most important issues in foundations of logic programming. We will look at several proposals for assigning such meaning.
Minimal models
As noticed above minimal models of a program always exist. However, a minimal model may be fairly artificial and may not be connected with the process of computation. To see that look at the program P 1 consisting of a single clause p ← ¬q.
Intuitively the "correct" model of P is {p} (q cannot be computed, so p can be), but 
Supported models
One can assign to a general program its completion Clark, [48] . Completion of the program is a first order theory obtained from P by the following procedure. For each predicate p a formula
is the completion of p. Here formulas B j , 1 ≤ j ≤ k are obtained by elimination of terms in the heads of clauses with head p. Completion of a program is the theory consisting of completions of predicates of the programs incremented by axioms about equality (so called Clark Equational Theory) A supported structure for P is a model of completion of P . Such structure is a model of P and so it is called supported model of P . Apt and van Emden, [49] proved that Herbrand models of completion of P are characterized as fixpoints of the operator T P .
Perfect model
Some programs allow for identification of a particular minimal model which has particularly nice properties. Call a program P stratified Apt, Blair and Walker, [50] if there is a function rank on the set of predicates of the program P such that whenever we have a clause of the form (5) then for all i rank(q i ) ≤ rank(p) and for all j, rank(r j ) < rank(p). The intuition is that the negative information necessary to compute the extension of the predicate p in the desired model of P must be computed Not every program is stratified, and so a perfect model is not always defined. If it exists then it is unique and does not depend on a particular stratification used in its construction. Moreover the perfect model of P is a model of completion of P as well. If P is a propositional program that is stratified than its perfect model can be computed in time linear in |P |. In predicate case Apt and Blair, [51] show that a program with n strata can compute a Σ 0 n complete set. Conversely the perfect model of a stratified program with n strata is Σ 0 n .
A "local" version of stratification is due to Przymusinski, [52] . Here we require that the rank is defined not on the set of all predicates of the language of the program but rather on the Herbrand base. The stratification conditions are similar, but pertain to clauses in ground(P ). Again, one can assign to a locally stratified program the perfect model. There is no difference between stratification and local stratification in the case of finite propositional programs. In the predicate case testing if P is locally stratified is Π 
Stable models
Gelfond and Lifschitz, [54] defined the notion of a stable model of a program. Let M be a subset of the Herbrand base of P . Reduce the program ground(P ) as follows.
Given a clause C p ← q 1 , . . . .q m , ¬r 1 , . . . , ¬r n in ground(P ) eliminate C altogether if for some j, r j ∈ M . Otherwise let C M be p ← q 1 , . . . .q m P M consists of C M for those C which are not eliminated. Since P M is a Horn program it possesses a least model N M . We call M a stable structure for P if N M = M . A stable structure for P (if exists) is a model of P . Moreover it is a model of completion of P and a minimal model of P . If P is stratified or locally stratified then P possesses a unique stable model. It is its perfect model. It turns out that stable models of general logic programs are closely connected with Default Logic, Bidoit and Froidevaux, [55] ,
Marek and Truszczynski, [56] . There exist programs without stable models. The existence problem for stable models of propositional general logic programs is NPcomplete, Marek and Truszczynski, [57] . For finite predicate general logic programs existence of a stable model is a Σ Konolige interpretation of default logic in autoepistemic logic, [64] , Truszczynski interpretation of default logic in nonmonotonic S4F , [65] and many others. Stable semantics of logic programs can be faithfully represented in both autoepistemic logic, [66] and in reflexive autoepistemic logic, [67] . Similarly, supported semantics for logic programs can be faithfully represented in autoepistemic logic, [68] .
Lifschitz, [69] introduced a general mechanism for uniform treatment of modal nonmonotonic logics in a single bimodal logic M BN F .
Computational mechanisms associated with modal nonmonotonic logics vary greatly in complexity. Because of existence of ranges, there is no simple correlation between the complexity of the underlying modal monotonic logic and the corresponding nonmonotonic modal logic. In the case of logic S4 modal nonmonotonic logic is computationally simpler than modal monotonic S4 Schwarz and Truszczynski, [70] . The case of autoepistemic logic has been especially thoroughly investigated by Gottlob,
[39] and Niemelä, [71] . Similarly to default logic the problems associated with autoepistemic expansions are on the second level of polynomial hierarchy. Specifically, existence problem is Σ P 2 -complete, membership in some expansion is Σ P 2 -complete and membership in all expansion a Π P 2 -complete problem. Generally, the complexity problems for nonmonotonic logics are not completely solved, yet.
Circumscription
Circumscription is a second-order technique for minimizing extensions of predicates.
In its simplest and most natural form circumscription scheme says that a theory implicitly defines a predicate it circumscribes McCarthy, [72] . Specifically, by circumscribing a predicate P in a theory T we assume that all the information about the predicate is given by T . Thus only those models where P is minimal need to be consider. Formally, let ϕ = ϕ(P ) be the conjunction of axioms of a finite theory T in the first order language containing the predicate P . The result of circumscribing P is the following second-order statement
where Q is a new predicate (not in the language under consideration. We then say that T circ |= ψ if Circ(T, P ) |= ψ. Clearly, circumscription is syntactically a secondorder formula (it quantifies a predicate). In fact for a theory T consisting of these axioms: ∀ x,y R(x, y) ⊃ P (x, y), and ∀ x,y,z R(x, y) ∧ P (y, z) ⊃ P (x, z), the result of circumscribing P by T defines the transitive closure of R -which is not first-order definable, in general. There are cases when circumscription reduces to first-order sentence. For instance theory T consisting of a single axiom
Lifschitz, in a series of papers [73, 74, 75, 76] analyzed the most important properties of circumscription.
When the theory T is a propositional theory, circumscribing theory T reduces to minimizing models of T (in general we can minimize some or all proposition variables in T ). Minimization of all propositional variables at once is known as extended generalized closed world assumption (GCWA) and has been studied by Yahia and Henschen, [77] , see also Minker, [78] . Clearly the entailment problem for propositional circumscription is decidable. An algorithm has been proposed by Przymusinski, [79] . In the predicate case the circumscription is very complex. Schlipf, [80] shows that all ∆ Well-founded semantics generalizes perfect semantics for stratified logic programs and in case when it produces a two-valued interpretation the resulting interpretation determines a unique stable model of the program. Van Gelder, [89] gave a polyno-mial computational procedure for computing well-founded semantics of propositional programs. Schlipf, [90] proved that in the predicate case well-founded semantics can define a complete Π properties of such systems in a uniform and efficient way.
Implementations
As mentioned above there are various algorithms for computations of structures associated with nonmonotonic reasoning. These algorithms have been or presently are being implemented by various groups of researchers. Historically first implementation of (a fragment of) default logic has been reported by Poole, [97] . Dixon and de
Kleer, [98] reported massively parallel implementation of T M S. Ginsberg, [99] reported implementation of circumscription. Warren, [100] reported an implementation of well-founded semantics. Bell et al., [101] implemented circumscription and stable semantics for propositional theories using an interpretation of these nonmonotonic systems in linear programming. Niemelä, [102] reported a fast implementation of full autoepistemic logic. Marek and Truszczynski, [103] reported implementation of a default reasoning system.
Conclusions and perspectives
Nonmonotonic reasoning is an active area of research in Artificial Intelligence. This research is actively pursued in many places around the world. Many areas not discussed in our short review are currently under development. These include abduction, [104] , nonmonotonic probabilistic reasoning, [105] , extended logic programming, [106] , be-lief revision, [107] and several other areas. Object-oriented programming, especially its use of classes, inheritance and overriding use technique of inheritance hierarchies with exceptions, [108] and will, doubtless, drive developments in nonmonotonic reasoning. We can expect many discoveries -a definitive description of nonmonotonic reasoning has not been done yet.
